Q&A with Author Rick Bowers

Author Rick Bowers spoke recently at the Museum’s Spies of the Civil Rights Movement program.  Here he answers some questions concerning the program and his book Spies of Mississippi: The True Story of the Spy Network that Tried to Destrpy the Civil Rights Movement

What was the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission and why was it formed? 

 The Commission was formed in 1956 as a direct response to the Supreme Court ruling in Brown vs Board or Education mandating public school integration. The Commission was to serve as the state’s segregation watchdog agency and was granted broad powers to infiltrate private organizations, keep secret records and take behind-the-scene actions to preserve segregation. 

 What was the original scope of the Commission and how did it evolve over time into a spy network?

 The Commission began as a pro-segregation propaganda service that promoted the virtues of a segregated society. Within the first couple of years the Commission began hiring investigators to provide the leadership of the state with intelligence on the NAACP. Faced with the challenge of infiltrating the civil rights groups, the self-described “segregation watchdog agency” started building a network of black collaborators to spy on their own. 

 What was the extent of this network of informants at its height? 

By the mid 1960s the program had evolved into a clandestine secret police operation, spying on more than 87,000 individuals and organizations and building an investigative file totaling more than 143,000 pages. White judges, sheriffs, deputies, clergymen, business owners and journalists served as informants. A surprising number of conservative black community leaders — as well as private detectives — worked undercover for the Commission to ferret out the secrets of the civil rights movement.            

 What were the ramifications of being added to the Commission’s ‘watch list?’

 To be on the Commission’s watch list meant that you were suspected on participating in subversive activities for the civil rights movement. The first step would usually involve a  Commission investigator paying you a visit and interviewing family members, employers, clergy etc. Dirty tricks could include getting the suspect fired from his/or her job or evicted from their home. In more serious cases suspects could be arrested on false charges, sent to prison or their names could be forwarded to the White Citizens Council or the Ku Klux Klan for much worse treatment.       

What was the lasting influence of the Commission on Mississippi after segregation?

 When the Commission files were finally made public in the late ’90s the public came to realize the vast scope of the secret spy operation and the extreme abuse of power perpetrated by the segregationist state. However little action was taken to address the abuse since — in many respects — the entire state government was complicit. In addition entire families were split apart when it was discovered that some members had taken payments from the commission to spy on their own relatives. While the state had certainly moved on from this period, the Commission remains an emotional topic for those who spied and those who were spied upon.

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SPY Historians Featured in Intelligence Journal

January 11, 2011

Mark Stout, SPY Historian

The breadth of espionage-related history scholarship is apparent in two recent articles featuring the work of the International Spy Museum’s Historian, Dr. Mark Stout and its previous Historian, Dr. Thomas Boghardt. Both appear in the journal Intelligence and National Security.

Stout explores Iraqi intelligence with Kevin Woods of the Institute for Defense Analyses in an article entitled “New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence during the Saddam Era.”  Their research used repositories of documents captured from the Iraqi intelligence services during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  (See here and here.)  The documents already available paint a picture in many ways reminiscent of the intelligence services of the totalitarian Soviet Union.  Moreover, these and forthcoming documents may enable important research on Iraq and on the role of intelligence services in totalitarian states.  The article also includes the text of an intelligence assessment of Iran completed by the Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate on the eve of the Iran-Iraq War and commentary by Woods and Stout on that estimate.  The estimate portrays an Iran still in chaos from the revolution of 1979 and helps us better understand why Saddam imagined that he could get away with invading his much larger neighbor.

Dr. Boghardt’s work forms an important part of another article in the journal, Dr. Nicholas Hiley’s “Re-Entering the Lists: MI5’s Authorized History and the August 1914 Arrests.”  Hiley takes on one of the legendary triumphs of Britain’s domestic intelligence service, MI5, namely that immediately upon the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 it captured all 21 German agents working in Britain.  Most recently a variation of this story appears in Dr. Christopher Andrew’s Defend the Realm:  The Authorized History of MI5.  Drawing on a variety of sources, including Boghardt’s book (based on research in German archives) about German intelligence operations in Britain, Hiley argues that this oft-repeated and inspiring story simply is not true.

For more information, see:

  • Christopher Andrew’s review of Boghardt’s Spies of the Kaiser.
  • A December 2009 Spycast of Christopher Andrew talking about his history of MI5.
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Spy Satellite Treasures at the National Archives

December 15, 2010

Mark Stout, SPY Historian

Everyone knows that the United States Government has been flying spy satellites for some fifty years.  The government declassified the CORONA program in 1995 and we all saw pictures of the Soviet Union that had long been TOP SECRET.  But how did the government’s imagery analysts use these pictures?  And what happened to the film that intelligence analysts pored over fifty years ago?

In an effort to answer these questions, my colleague Dan Treado and I visited the National Archives at College Park for a look at some of their remarkable holdings dealing with satellite reconnaissance.  The records that we saw were once kept in vaults at classified facilities.  Now they are in the stacks at the National Archives and though we got a special dispensation for a behind-the-scenes visit, they can be retrieved for any researcher who wants to work with them.

When we arrived, two archivists led us into one of the Archives’ several cavernous storage rooms containing declassified records.  Here we found the actual canisters containing the film that the imagery analysts of CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) worked with.

CORONA film canisters

CORONA film canisters. The black pen marks strike through their original classification markings.
Photo: Dan Treado

What’s on these rolls of film?  Of course, there were images of the ground, as you might expect.  Early on, however, a “horizon camera” was added to take an additional picture of the arc of the Earth with each image of the ground.  This second image helped analysts determine precisely where the main camera was pointing.

CORONA film on a light table.
Photo: Dan Treado

The CORONA program (and the short-lived related ARGON and LANYARD programs) ended up producing some 2.1 million feet of film containing some 866,000 images.

One of the hundreds of aisles of CORONA film canisters.
Photo: Dan Treado

 

This is a huge amount of film and that in itself created a major challenge.  Imagine, for instance, that an analyst is sitting at a light table analyzing an image of the Soviet Union and he or she wants to know when a particular building was built.  In order to answer that question, the analyst will need to look at older images.  Clearly, plowing frame by frame through the mountain of CORONA film looking for the right images is not an option.  What to do?

A CORONA light table. This table allowed analysts to closely examine the film.
Photo: Dan Treado

The CIA had a clever solution which the National Archives has faithfully preserved.  The Agency took a set of maps covering the entire world and pasted on them copies of each of their images, printed to the same scale as the maps, and augmented with reference data allowing retrieval of the film.  An analyst wanting to find earlier imagery of a particular target would only have to go to the appropriate map, see what was pasted on it, and then retrieve the indicated canister of film.  (In fact, this is the same process that an historian wanting to use the film at the Archives would go through today.)

A map next to its corresponding CORONA film. Kyrgyzstan is to the north and to the south is The People’s Republic of China.
Photo: Dan Treado

 

With the proper imagery at hand the analyst could write up a report that would go to policymakers and other analysts.  Though we did not look at them on this trip, many of these reports are available at the Archives on the CIA’s CREST database. Samples can also be found in the CIA History Staff’s fine volume on the Corona program.

A declassified imagery analysis report. The Talent and Keyhole codewords referred respectively to the product of manned reconnaissance flights and the product of satellite reconnaissance.

The CIA put Corona imagery to other uses, as well.  Sometimes analysts or policymakers found it helpful to see in three dimensions what the satellite images showed.  For this purpose, NPIC maintained a model shop.  Sadly, most of the models were flimsy to begin with and they have not aged well.  In fact, only two of the models are in the National Archives, though a few may be populating display cases and book shelves at CIA and other agencies.  Today we’ll show one of them.  A future blog post will feature the other.

The label on this model shows what it is:

And here it is in all its glory:

The modelers made these pieces to an exacting level of detail. Here we can see the representation of the Soviet ICBM launch apparatus.

We shall never see the likes of such models again.  Today such models would probably be made virtually in a computer.  However, we are fortunate that the outstanding professionals who work at National Archives have saved these models and all the other Corona records for the benefit of historians and through them for all of us.  In the National Archives, the American taxpayer is getting a good deal.


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Bulgaria's Assassination Squad

December 10, 2010

Mark Stout, SPY Historian

Alexenia Dimitrova is one of the leading investigative journalists in Bulgaria, where she works for the second largest daily newspaper, 24 Hours.  She has made a specialty of reporting on Bulgaria’s Communist-era intelligence services.  She was kind enough to answer a few questions from the International Spy Museum.

Ms. Dimitrova, your latest book is entitled Murder Bureau.  Its about some of the brutalities of the Communist Bulgarian security service, the DS, during the Cold War.  Can you tell us a bit about the DS and its notorious “Service 7”? 

First, let me say that Service 7 was not notorious until July 2010 when I published Murder Bureau. The news and the documentary proof of this super-secret department were a surprise not only for my readers but also for me.

I have been digging into Bulgarian Secret Archives since 1990, immediately after the fall of Todor Zhivkov [the last Bulgarian Communist leader], but only twice in these years had I encountered hints—mostly rumors—that a separate unit responsible for so called “sharp measures” had existed in the Bulgarian State Security. 

The first hint appeared back in early 90s. At that time I read a publication which alleged the existence of such a special unit within the First Main Directorate of the State Security—the Intelligence Directorate. Unfortunately, at that time the intelligence archives were not open to the public, so I was not able to look for proof.

Years later, in 1999, I read an interview with a former director of the Bulgarian Intelligence before 1989 Gen. Vlado Todorov. In the interview he claimed that there were only three cases of treason among the Bulgarian intelligence officers. One of the names he mentioned was Trayco Belopopsky. I sent a written request for all documents related to Belopopsky from the archive of the Ministry of Interior, which is separate from the Intelligence Archive.

When I got the documents I read that in 1964 Belopopsky was sentenced to death. I also read that he was born in 1935. My presumption was that the sentence was not carried out because he was out of the country and was sentenced in absentia. This gave me hope that he might be found alive somewhere around the world.  I started searching for him in UK and in the USA, and months later I found him in New York.

He did not want to talk publicly but we had a long private correspondence. In May 2006 he shared the following:

“There was a secret Department of Wet Affairs (mokridela) [a Communist intelligence term referring to assassination]. The first head of the Department was the director of Sofia prison. His inmates became his staff, hardened criminals. They were sent abroad to do the killings and kidnappings, both for the Russians and the Bulgarians. Zhivkov had to have a former officer killed in Spain because the man had documents proving that Zhivkov was an agent of the tsarist secret police.I was still a student at Cambridge and they brought my father, hoping he will persuade me to return. They provided him with a present for me, when that failed, several “lukanka” [Bulgarian sausages]. When a piece of lukanka was given to a stray dog, it died within minutes in terrible agony. That was what gift they wanted the father to give his son. This is just one of many incidents. No matter what they say now, there are still people who want my head. They lost their good jobs and their careers were in ruin.”

This e-mail affected me and I asked myself – was this man right or he was paranoid?

I sent a written request to the Intelligence archive asking whether such a unit had existed. I got a negative response. Then, in 2006 a law for access to the secret documents from the communist era was passed. Shortly after that a small part of the inventories of the Bulgarian Intelligence Archives was publicly opened. I went and started reading them.

Honestly, I was not very confident that I would find such evidence because many documents had been destroyed. But I was lucky that the people who decided what to destroy had thought only about the recent past and not about earlier years. This way some documents had survived. I found some files left with abbreviations OM, SM, DM and AM in the titles. They meant Sharp and Special Measures, Disinformation and Active Measures… When I ordered and opened the files, I was shocked. There I found for first time real proof of the existence and the activities of a special unit carrying out such activities called Service 7. This name was not public until then.  

 Is there one particular victim of Service 7 who stands out in your mind?

All the cases are very interesting – 10 Bulgarian emigrants in 9 countries: German France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, Denmark, and Ethiopia.  They were targeted by Service 7 to be poisoned, kidnapped, discredited killed (which in the documents is mentioned as “clearance” or “liquidation”).  Later I found some of these people or their relatives and interviewed them. This gave me additional information beyond what I found in the documents.

And by the way it really turned out that Belopopsky had been one of the targets of the secret unit. Unfortunately he did not live to see the documents which supported his suspicions. He died in early 2008.

 In the International Spy Museum we have an example of the kind of poison-tipped umbrella that was used to kill Georgi Markov in London in 1978.  Was Markov’ murder an operation by Service 7?

Markov was murdered long after the founding of Service 7 in 1963. The documents which I found are for the period 1963-1974.  My presumption is that the Service continued operating after 1974, but most probably documents about later activities of Service 7 and its eventual successor and the preparation of the assassination of Markov have been destroyed.

Who chose the victims? 

Good question. I still wonder who was the mastermind behind Service 7’s activities. Ambitious low-level officers from that unit who wanted to make advance their careers?  Or high-level officials in the State Security? I found documents showing that high-level officials had sought help from the KGB and other communist services for Service 7’s activities but I did not find documents discussing who the victims should be. However keep in mind that more than 3,000 pages about the unit and its targets were destroyed.

What sort of response have you received from Bulgarians about this book and your previous exposés of the abuses of the Communist regime? 

It depends of the category of the readers. Ordinary people have welcomed the exposing of the truth. I got tens of phone calls, e-mails and letters from people, who applauded me for being brave enough to publish these facts and the documents.  I have also traveled around Bulgaria to discuss the book and I have felt the same attitude.

At the same time, people who were involved with the former State Security have tried to downplay the truth. In one such case, when the anchor of a TV show invited a former officer from the intelligence services to discuss the book with me, the officer refused saying that these were pure fantasies.  Also in the very first day of the publication I got a threatening anonymous phone call in the office. I invited the caller to come to talk about it but he hung up the phone. 

I also heard some comments that Service 7 was not a big deal because similar services have existed within the CIA and the Mossad too. I do not know if this is true or not. However this is not  argument not to expose documents and evidences about their Bulgarian counterpart. 

The veterans of DS have not been happy about my work for several years.  They were not happy with my first 3 books: The Iron Fist (2005) which is available in English, The War of the Spies (2005) and The King’s Secret Files(2009). They think that exposing these secret documents, I have betrayed their work. This is not true of course.

I understand that you were also able to do useful research in the United States.

Yes.  During my specializations in journalism at the World Press Institute in St. Paul, Minnesota (1996), the University of Columbia in Missouri (1998), and the University of Minnesota (2006), I learned that accessing and exposing documents under the American Freedom of Information Act is one of the strongest weapons of the journalist. So in 1998 I started requesting documents about Bulgaria during the Cold War from American government agencies. One of the reasons for this was that many of the documents in Bulgaria had been destroyed and the US was the only place where we could read some truths about our country.

Are there plans to publish Murder Bureau in English?

I would be more than happy to do this. I want to expose this truth for as large an international public as possible. This way the people in Bulgaria who are trying to underestimate the truth and are saying that the documents are pure fantasy, will have no more ground to do this. 

However I am realistic that Bulgaria by itself could not attract a large international attention. I think that an international investigation about similar units in the former Soviet satellite countries, the Soviet Union, or even in some Western countries, could be more attractive for the international reader.

After the publication of Murder BureauI also was told about a Stasi assassination unit in East Germany and a book published about it by Thomas Auerbach.

My work and other work like mine could be included in an eventual international documentary research project on the issue. I would be happy to contribute for the Bulgarian part.

If you read Bulgarian and wish to purchase a copy of Murder Bureau, please contact Alexenia Dimitrova at alexenia@gmail.com.


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Former SPY Historian on East German Intelligence

November 24, 2010

Mark Stout, SPY Historian

A great deal has been written about the Stasi’s internal intelligence operations and a compelling movie, The Lives of Others , brought the topic to the big screen in a realistic way. However, little has been written about what the Stasi’s foreign intelligence component, the HVA, did abroad. Fortunately, Dr. Thomas Boghardt, the former Historian of the International Spy Museum, has just published a review of a new book, entitled East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy . Because the book is, shall we say, priced to sell to libraries, you will wish to read Boghardt’s comprehensive review .

Continue reading

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Confronting McCarthyism, Confronting Espionage, Confronting Lies

November 23, 2010

Mark Stout, SPY Historian

History News Network has an interesting review of a play now running in New York that addresses the issues of espionage and lying.  The play, “After the Revolution” focuses on a young woman of relentlessly liberal persuasion who is appalled to learn that historians have just determined that her grandfather, an icon of the American left for having stood up to the House Un-American Activities Committee had, in fact, been a spy for Stalin.  In the words of the reviewer, Dr. Bruce Chadwick who lectures on history and film at Rutgers, the play asks whether the fictional Grandpa Joe Joseph was a “truly great man who did one thing wrong,” or “a spy who betrayed his country?” 

As art, the play is apparently a bit flawed—Chadwick calls the dialogue “tepid” and another reviewer calls the main character “a blubberer and a bore”—but it portrays a situation that is all too real, one fraught with emotional pain.  Alger Hiss went to his grave denying that he had spied for the Soviets.  In so doing he deceived and exploited many well intentioned people who had vigorously defended him.  The documents now available, not least the Venona decrypts, make this clear.

I witnessed such a phenomenon in the spring of 2009, at a conference at the Woodrow Wilson Center about Soviet espionage in the United States from 1930 to 1950.  (See here and here.)  Much of this conference revolved around the so-called “Vassiliev notebooks” and Spies, the monumental book by John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev that used the Vassiliev material.   One of the subjects of Spies was I. F. Stone, the legendary radical journalist in whose honor Harvard University offers the “I. F. Stone Award for Journalistic Independence.”  Haynes, Klehr and Vassiliev convincingly demonstrated that Stone had worked for the KGB from 1936 to 1938.  However, one of Stone’s admiring biographers was present and he mounted a spirited defense of the journalist, arguing that he had only shared political gossip with the Soviets and that this amounted neither legally nor morally to espionage.  While the biographer’s persistent and increasingly disruptive comments were annoying, I couldn’t help feeling a bit sorry for him as his hero was discredited.  How much greater must be the pain when the accused is a beloved family member.

Every spy assumes great risk.  Even aside from the risk to life and limb, however, is the risk that the spy will choose the wrong side of history and that his (or her) friends and family will be left holding the bag.

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SPY at the Movies

November 15, 2010

Executive Director – Peter Earnest

Ever wonder what a real spy thinks of spy movies?  Our resident Spy Peter Earnest  went to E Street Theater to check out the movie Fair Game last night and shares his thoughts:

 Our visitors often ask about the plausibility of movies so I’m glad to say here’s one I can recommend.  Yes, perhaps Valerie’s field work is a little over the top but it is along the lines of what her work was.  It also vividly shows the consequences of her public exposure on both sources and others she may have “under development.”  I also found the depiction of the Agency’s slamming the door in her face and freezing her out not plausible, at least in my memory.  The Agency would be too interested in her working with her to contain the damage to behave so ruthlessly.  Nevertheless, she was a consultant to the film and has gone on the record speaking positively about it.  I’ll be in touch with her and share any feedback of interest. I do recommend it.  We may want to have her back.  Remember, when we did “Dinner with a Spy, I don’t think she had done her book yet.” – Peter Earnest, International Spy Museum

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The Georgian Spy Case: “Chronic Spy Mania” Flares Up

November, 9th 2010

SPY Historian Mark Stout

 On November 5 the Government of Georgia announced the arrest of thirteen people whom they accused of working for Russian military intelligence, the GRU.  The suspects included four Russians and nine Georgians.  The four Russians included one GRU officer and three businessmen, including one who worked for an American company.  The Georgians included six pilots in the Georgian military, a naval communications engineer, and two businessmen.

 This case is an object lesson in the importance of erecting a solid counterintelligence shield around intelligence operations.  It would appear that the Russians got stung by a double agent operation run by a lesser power, much as the American CIA got stung earlier this year in Afghanistan by al Qaeda when a clandestine source conducted a suicide attack inside a CIA base.  (The difference, of course, is that several Americans and a Jordanian died in that fiasco, whereas probably nobody has died yet in the current dust-up in the Caucasus.)  Apparently the Georgians found a retired Soviet army officer, whom they refer to as “Enveri,” who was willing to work with them.  A native of Georgia, Enveri reconnected with his old colleagues and asked them how he could receive a pension from the Russian government.  Soon the GRU came calling, eager to use him as a spy.  The GRU shared its communications secrets with  him and he turned them over to the Georgians who used the information to nail the spies.  Among these secrets, it seems, were how the Russians used steganography to hide messages in digital photographs and even in music.  Chris de Burgh’s “Lady in Red” has been mentioned.  The mind boggles.

 In any event, don’t expect this to be swept under the rug as the US-Russian flap was.  The Georgians make a habit of tweaking the nose of the Russian bear.  The Georgians actually made the arrests late last month, but they waited until Russia’s Military Intelligence Officer Day to make the announcement.  They then promptly broadcast a partially dramatized television documentary, which “Enveri” narrated, about the scandal.  For their part, the Russians have a habit of bullying Georgia.  In 2008 the Russians invaded Georgia in support of South Ossetian separatists in that country.  Later in the year the Russians extended diplomatic relations to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, yet another breakaway region of Georgia.  The Russian Foreign Ministry has responded to this latest incident by accusing the Georgian government of “chronic spy mania fueled by anti-Russian sentiment.”  Just this morning, the Russian Foreign Minister himself dismissed suggestion of a spy swap:  “We do not hold talks on such issues. This is an act of provocation.”

 I will simply close with the words of Russian columnist Yuliya Latynina writing in Novaya Gazeta Online“It is not shameful to spy; it is shameful to get caught.”

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Awlaki Visited the Pentagon in 2001: Was This A Security Failure?

SPY Historian Mark Stout

A story breaking in the news recently highlights the difficulty of knowing who-is-who in the murky worlds of intelligence, security, and terrorism.  It also shows the difficulty of seeing the future, a core aim of the intelligence analyst.

Fox News has reported and other media outlets have confirmed that radical imam Anwar al-Awlaki, dined at the Pentagon in the months after 9/11 as part of the Defense Department’s effort to reach out to American Muslims.  Awlaki, of course, some ten years ago preached at a mosque in San Diego and then at the Dar al Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church Virginia.  At both of these he came into contact with some of the 9/11 hijackers.  More recently, he has been linked to Ft. Hood shooter Major Nidal Hasan, underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and Times Square bomber Feisal Shahzad.  Awlaki is presently thought to be in Yemen working with al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.  He has been widely reported to be on a list of Americans whom the CIA can kill abroad without trial.

Fox News quotes an anonymous former high-ranking FBI official as criticizing Awlaki’s invitation to the Pentagon by saying that as of 2001 there was a great “arrogance” about the Pentagon’s procedures for vetting who they would allow in the building: “They vetted people politically and showed indifference toward security and intelligence advice of others.”

There are two problems with such a criticism. 

First, in outreach and diplomacy, as in espionage, one often has to deal cooperatively with people with whom one does not fully agree.  Given Awlaki’s public persona in 2001, it was not unreasonable to reach out to him.  There are many precedents for such a policy.  During the Cold War, the CIA conducted an extensive and long-running campaign of reaching out to the “non-Communist left” in Europe as a way of co-opting them from allying with the Soviets.  The US Government also made common cause with Communist Yugoslavia, Romania, and China against the Soviet Communists.  For their part, case officers often have to deal with unsavory people in their efforts to get information about other even more unsavory people.  By the same token, the police routinely work with informants and prison snitches who are not typically nice people themselves. 

Second, it is important to remember that in 2001 the Pentagon could not know the place that Awlaki would have in the terrorist world in 2010.  Forecasting the future is hard and Awlaki has undergone an ideological evolution over time.  At the time of 2001 he was sufficiently moderate to head a mainstream mosque and to impress a Pentagon employee who heard him speak.  (The FBI documents that Fox News obtained showed that this was the proximate cause of his invitation to the Pentagon.)  This is the man who told visitors to his mosque after 9/11 that “we came here to build not to destroy…We are the bridge between Americans and one billion Muslims worldwide.”  Awlaki himself at one point was even criticized from within the jihadist movement for being insufficiently radical.  Now, however, he is one of the leading lights of the jihadist movement, a radical firebrand if ever there was one.

In short, the future is hard to predict, identities can change over time, and deception is an ever present possibility.  With 20/20 hindsight we can criticize past analyses and past decisions, but that’s not always helpful…or fair.

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Intelligence is Cramping al Qaeda’s Style

SPY Historian Mark Stout

The second issue of Inspire, the English language magazine of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) popped up online on 11 October.[1]  The first issue came out in July, though for several days only the first few pages could be read due to a problem with the PDF file.  (The jihadists blamed the US Government for sabotaging the piece.)  Inspire is aimed largely at would-be home-grown American jihadists.  It tries to fill them with revolutionary Islamist zeal and to teach them how they can contribute to the global jihad.  AQAP has struck again in the war of ideas.

First the slightly alarming news from this latest issue: the magazine suggests creating the “ultimate mowing machine” by attaching horizontal blades to a large pickup truck and driving it through a crowd to “mow down the enemies of Allah.”

 Now the more encouraging news: it is striking how much the various authors featured in the magazine seem concerned about the threat posed by the intelligence and security services, both of the United States and of Arab countries.  They make clear that the security forces have tremendous advantages that impinge on virtually every part of the jihadists’ lives.

 Electronic surveillance and the difficulties of secure communication loom particularly large in the jihadists concerns.  Yahya Ibrahim, the author of the “ultimate mowing machine” article, urges his brethren to use electronic communications only for non-jihad related activities and “if it is necessary for the work to use the mobile phone or internet, then use it with proper security measures such as a coded language…or…encryption software from a terminal that cannot be traced back to you.”  This issue also contains part two of a series on how to use a special encryption program called Asrar al-Mujahideen 2.0 to secure internet communications and “shred” computer files.  However, even this program is no cure-all: “it is important to note that getting caught from the intelligence services for using this program will most likely end you up in prison.” [sic]

 The lethal international reach of American hard power, including the military and the CIA, shows up in an article by Adam Gadahn in which the renegade American explains the steps that “Barack” must take if he wishes peace with the Muslims.  The first item on the list is: “you must pull every last one of your soldiers, spies, security advisors, trainers, attachés, contractors, robots, drones and all other American personnel, ships, and aircraft out of every Muslim land from Afghanistan to Zanzibar.”  Similarly, Samir Khan, a former resident of North Carolina and jihadist blogger, says he detected an American spy watching him after he moved to Yemen.  Uthman al-Ghamidi a senior leader of AQAP talks about the presence of American intelligence officers in Muslim lands, as well.  He also recounts how Saudi intelligence watched him like a hawk even after he was released.  We were freed but we were still like prisoners.…We were continuously being called in for questioning and they would use the excuse that they just wanted to check on our wellbeing.…Our every move was being monitored.” 

 Fellow Muslims or alleged Muslims can also be serious threats, according to Inspire.  Though ultimately he scoffs at their efforts, Samir Khan recounts how American intelligence agencies “were watching me for all those years” in America.  He says the FBI even dispatched a spy to watch him who pretended to convert to Islam.  Yahya Ibrahim warns that “if the Feds suspect you are up to something, they may try to set you up through an informant.  There were quite a few brothers who were….sold out by brothers who ended up collaborating with the authorities.”  Mukhtar Hassan, the author of an article on the realities of life in the jihadist camps, picked up a different aspect of this theme: 

 One of the pillars of contemporary jihad is secrecy.  If its members don’t practice this amongst themselves, it is possible for the movement to fall apart.  What is meant here by secrecy is hiding from the people your personal information except for those details that the Amir has allowed.  This is because if a mujahid is captured by the enemy and is interrogated through torture, he might give away your details.

 What does all of this add up to?  The short answer is “friction” and lots of it.  The great German philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”  This phrase well describes the jihadists’ reality.  They can imagine many simple ways of killing infidels but executing these simple plans is difficult.  So many things could go fatally wrong and many of them are linked to the intelligence and security agencies.  Even the “ultimate mowing machine” plan turns out to be difficult to implement.  Yahya Ibrahim advises that the welding of the blades onto the truck should be done “right before you take off…so as to not give the authorities a chance to botch the operation.”

 It seems that being on the defense against terrorists is hard, but terrorists also have a hard time being on the offense.


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